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One  of the uncritically  accepted assumptions  regarding  the struc-
ture  of American  agriculture  involves  the inevitability  of continuing
increases  in farm  size,  concentration  of  control, and specialization.
Until quite recently, the power of this assumption has been sufficient
to  inhibit  any  serious  efforts  within  the  agricultural  establishment
to  analyze the possible  consequences.  This paper  points up some  of
the issues that  seem likely to arise  if there is a continuation of these
trends toward  a concentration  of economic power in agriculture.
It explores  several  problem areas that promise  to prove  critical in
the shaping of public policy toward agriculture  in the coming decade.
The Fragmentation  of the Agricultural Sector
We  can  begin this  exploration by noting that the farm  sector  has
become  so  specialized that we  can no longer  describe  it in generali-
ties.  Farm price supports unquestionably  contribute today to rigidity
and  inflation  in  dairy  products  and  sugar,  but have been  much  less
significant  in  foodgrain  and  feedgrain  crops  in  recent  years.  In the
international  dimension,  this  is  reflected  in  a bimodal  policy struc-
ture:  Prices  for wool  and  sugar  can be supported by import policies;
price  supports for grains and cotton involve export policies.
The  most  portentous  change  involves  the  increasing  cleavage
between the livestock  and the grains sectors.  This functional separa-
tion  has  probably  been the primary  cause  for the decline  of broad-
based  farm  organizations  and the rise of  special-interest  commodity
groups.  This  sets  the  stage  for  jurisdictional  conflict  within  agri-
culture  that  is  analogous  to  the  conflicts  within  organized  labor
when  structured  by  the boundaries  of  crafts  or  trades.  At  a  time
when  the trend  in  organized  labor is toward a broad-based,  industry-
wide  structure,  agriculture  is  fragmenting  itself  in  a fashion  that is
reminiscent  of ancient  crafts and guilds.
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losing its uniqueness.  If life-styles  are  the unit of measurement,  this
is true.  But it  may  be  more  useful  for  economic  analysis  to point
out  that  the  production  sectors  within  agriculture  are  becoming
more  parcelized,  fragmented,  and  specialized.  Farm  firms that could
in  the  past  internalize  many  of  the  countervailing  trends  in  com-
modity  prices  and  market  gyrations  must now  struggle with market-
induced  external  forces  that  leave  them  much  more  exposed  to
unstable prices.
As  a  consequence,  an  agricultural  structure  is  evolving  that  will
increase  tension  and  conflict  within  agriculture,  in both  functional
and regional dimensions. Agriculture is not only losing its uniqueness;
more importantly, it is losing its cohesion.
The Lack of Balance in Popular  Perceptions  of
Structural Trends in Agriculture
The  discussion  of tenure, control, and concentration  in agriculture
has  been  distorted  by  our taste for  "false  bad  news".  For  example:
1.  The  family  farm  labor force  is  declining  but the proportion  of
the  labor  force  employed  in  regions  where  family-type  farms
predominate  is  increasing.  From  1965-67  to  1975-77,  the  hired
farm labor force in the North Central  Region increased 27 percent,
while decreasing  by  22 percent in the South and  13 percent in the
West.  In  the  same  10-year  period,  the proportion  of regular and
year round  workers  in the hired  farm  labor  force increased, while
the proportion of seasonal  and casual workers declined.l
2. Full-tenant  operated  farms have been declining, but the propor-
tion  of  farm  land  operated  by part-owners  has sharply  increased.
The  proportion  of total  farm  land  operated  under  lease  has  re-
mained  relatively  constant,  but  most  of  it  is  now  operated  by
individuals  who  also  own  land.  The  proportion  of  the  nation's
farm  land  that  is  under  the  managerial  control  of  those  who
approach  their  managerial  decision-making  with  the  orientation
of owner-operators  is probably at an all-time high.
3.  Data  on  concentration  in  farming  based  on the gross value  of
products  sold  seriously  over-state  the  degree  of  concentration
based  on  value-added.  The  data  are  even  more  misleading if they
lead  to  inferences  with  regard  to concentration  measured  in land
use.  The  output  from  crop  acres  is  still  widely  dispersed  among
a  population  of  family-type  farms,  although  their  size  in  acres
has been steadily increasing.
4. The  loss  of  land  from  agriculture  due  to  urbanization,  while
serious,  has  been  over-dramatized  on  the  basis  of  statistics  that
1Gene  Rowe,  The  Hired Farm Working Force in 1977, U.S.  Dept. of Agriculture,  ESCS,
Agr. Economic Report  No. 437,  October  1979, pp.  15-16.
154cover  an  exceptional  period  in  the  evolution  of  the  national
urban system.
Perceptions  of the nature  of structural  change  in agriculture  have
been  distorted  by  these  and  other  similar  tendencies  to  strive  for
dramatic  effects  in  reporting  the  major  changes  that  are  in  fact
under  way.  One  consequence  has  been  the  diversion  of  attention
from  the  key  questions  of who  will  emerge  as owners  of the assets
of agriculture,  and  who  will  make  the investment  decisions that will
determine  the  pace  and  direction  of  future  agricultural  advances.
The investment decision-making function is crucial.
Investment Consequences of Structural Change
A  continuing  trend  toward  more  highly  concentrated  and  spe-
cialized  agricultural  production  units  will  generate  questions  about
the  proper  source  of  investment  capital  and  the  proper  locus  of
investment  decisions.  There  has never  been a  significant demand  in
the  United  States  for  the  social  ownership  of  agricultural  land.
Demands  of this nature  have found little support because the owner-
ship  pattern  of  rural  lands  has  been  so  widely  diffused  that  occa-
sional  large  holdings  were  not  perceived  as  either  an  economic  or
a political threat to conventional  goals and values.
If  the  ownership  of  agricultural  land  does  become  relatively
concentrated,  we  can  expect  the  demand  for  land  reform  in  the
United  States  to  accelerate.  In  the  political  arena,  this  will reflect
concerns  that  are  based  primarily  on  questions  of  equity.  In  the
economic  arena,  the issue  will  be  focused  on questions of efficiency
in  the  provision  of  capital,  and  on  the  quality  of investment  deci-
sions.
One  consequence  of  concentration  in  agriculture  is  to  inject  a
managerial  link  into  the  decision  chain  that  relates  investment
decisions to  production  outcomes.  Is this link needed?  Does it serve
a useful purpose?
If  investment  decision-making  is to be taken out of the hands  of
producers,  there  should be some  persuasive reason  why they can no
longer  be  permitted  to  determine  the  direction  of future  develop-
ment  in  agriculture.  It seems  reasonable to  argue that no determina-
tion of this kind has  been  made,  and that the question of "who will
make the investment decisions in agriculture"  has not been asked.
Instead,  a more  likely  explanation  for the emerging concentration
of  economic  power,  and  of  a  managerial  cadre  linking  capital  to
labor  in  agriculture,  is  the  institutional  structure  that  makes  it
difficult  for individuals  to generate  capital  on  the scale  now needed
in  modern  farming.  The  proprietary  farm  firm  suffers  from  two
disadvantages:
(a)  It  must  purchase  production  inputs  at  retail  and  pay  retail
sales tax.
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rather than  at the flat rate that characterizes  the corporate income
tax on incomes over  $100,000.
As  a result,  an  advantage  is  given  to the form  of business  enter-
prise that  is  large  enough to  be taxed  at the flat  46 percent  corpo-
rate  rate,  or to  proprietary  firms  that  are  large  enough  to  benefit
from  the  progressively  increasing  value  of  business-expense  deduc-
tions from personal income tax liability.
In  either  case,  a  larger  scale  of  farming  enterprise  is  needed  to
secure  these  advantages.  To  operate  the  needed  large-scale  enter-
prise  a  managerial  class  is  needed  that does not provide  the  capital
and does not provide the labor.
For  this  more  complex  managerial  structure  to  operate  success-
fully  the  number  of variables  dealt  with  by  management  must  be
reduced  as  much  as  possible.  This  is  achieved  by concentrating  on
one  crop  or product, and  by  selecting the crop  or product that can
be produced with the smallest amount of managerial input.
This  leads to  a preference  for monocultural  field  crops  or single-
product  livestock  feeding  enterprises.  This  further  accelerates  the
trend  toward  concentration,  by  generating  both  backward  and
forward  linkages  to  input-supply  and  product-marketing  firms
that are  tailored to monoculture,  or one-product  firms. This weakens
the  market  infrastructure  that  had  grown  up  in  the  past  to  serve
multiple-crop or "mixed farming".
This  trend  toward  concentration  and  specialization  is  furthered
by  the  system  of  higher  education  in  agriculture  which  puts a pre-
mium on turning out "managers."
Flexibility,  adaptability,  and  resiliency  are  lost  in  the  process.
A  production  system  in  agriculture  that  combined  the  functions
of  capitalist,  manager,  and  laborer  permitted  the  shortest  possible
information  chain  linking decisions  to invest (and capacity to invest)
with  the evaluation  of the outcome.  There  was  no  managerial layer-
ing  in  the  feedback  chain.  When  something  was  wrong  with a  field
activity  the  capitalist  knew  it without  any  filtering  of the informa-
tion through an intermediate  managerial  relay.
When  wage  rates  were  unsupported  by  earnings  of the firm,  the
wage  rate  could  be  adjusted  immediately.  At the  extreme, produc-
tion  could  be  stopped  with  a minimum  of social costs.  The  system
thus contained  built-in  stabilizing  devices  that led to efficient invest-
ment and production  decision-making.
For the  loss of this closed-circuit  feed-back  chain  represented  by
the single-proprietor  farm firm to be a social gain there must be some
larger  advantages  from  concentration  and  specialization.  What  are
they? Possible answers include:
(a)  Ease and reduced cost of mobilizing capital in large amounts.
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standardized, repetitious tasks.
(c)  Institutional  advantages  growing  out  of the  educational  sys-
tem,  which  in effect  produces  trained  people  whose  outlook and
training  causes  them  to  prefer  a  structure  of agriculture  that in-
cludes  a managerial  echelon, which is the level for which they have
been equipped. They are risk-averse.
These  are  powerful  incentives  for  a  continuation  of  the  trend
toward  a separation  of decisions regarding investment from decisions
regarding  production  activities  in  agriculture.  They  offer  short-run
gains  that  can  be captured  by  individual firms, but they also  intro-
duce  a bureaucratic  managerial  structure that seems likely to involve
long-run social cost.
Some Potential  Consequences of International  Market Linkages
for Highly Concentrated  and Specialized Agricultural  Areas
Agricultural  states have not been as seriously affected by domestic
swings  in the business  cycle  as have industrial states in recent years.2
This may  change  with  increasing  concentration  and  specialization
in agriculture.  The domestic  business  cycle  is increasingly  enmeshed
in  the  international  business  cycle,  especially  as  it  affects  our  de-
veloped-country  trading  partners.  The  rapid  expansion  in  export
markets  for agricultural  products cushioned the effects of the domes-
tic downswing in economic activity in 1973-74, and again in 1979-80.
This may not be repeated in the next business cycle downturn.
The  much  greater  dependence  of  monocultural  or  duocultural
areas  on  foreign  markets  (the  corn-soybean  and  wheat-sorghum
states  in particular)  may result in a feed-back to agriculture of future
U.S. business  cycle  trends via the international  market. The growing
interdependence  of the markets  if the developed countries may thus
reduce  the  cushioning  effects  that  export  markets  have  provided
agriculture in the 1970's.
If this  occurs,  it will  reveal  the vulnerability  of agricultural  areas
that  have  experienced  the  most  pronounced  concentration  in  firm
size and specialization  in one or two products.
The Larger Significance of Concentration  in Agriculture
Are we losing flexibility in the agricultural sector? Tibor Scitovsky
attributes the survival  of capitalism  to its flexibility.3 The  U.S.  agri-
cultural  sector  has  had one of the best  "flexibility  indexes" of any
sector in the U.S. economy. Why?
2Norman  J.  Glickman,  International Trade,  Capital Mobility, and Economic Growth:
Some Implications for American Cities  in  the 1980's, Report to the President's Commission
on  a  National  Agenda  for  the 1980's,  Symposium sponsored  by the  National  Academy  of
Sciences,  et al.  Washington,  D.C., June 3-4,  1980, p. 3.
3Can  Capitalism  Survive?-An  Old Question  in  a  New  Setting,  Am.  Econ.  Review,
Vol. 70,  No. 2, May 1980, pp. 1-9.
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gain  in land  values?  Is this  why the  structure of agriculture could be
altered  so drastically without leading to violent protest?
One  possible  argument  is  that  a  structure  of  small,  privately
owned  farms reduces  the social  cost of exit from agriculture because
it remains  reasonable  to  believe that entry  is possible, or reentry.  If
entry  into  agriculture  is  closed,  or very  difficult,  it will retard  exit.
The  difficulty  of getting  started in  farming  is  thus of much  wider
significance  than  is  typically  assumed.  It  mirrors the  "freezing-up"
of  the  agricultural  sector,  which  was  the  last  major  sector  that
offered  relative  freedom  to  small-scale  entrepreneurs.  With  agricul-
ture  practically  closed  to  entry  by  any  but the  wealthy,  how is  it
possible  to  maintain  the  illusion  of  an  open  economy  guided  by
freely  functioning markets?
Loss  of flexibility  reflected  in a growing  concentration  of control
in  agriculture  thus  has  a  significance  that  extends  far  beyond  the
agricultural  sector.  It  erodes  the  empirical  base  for  a  belief  in  a
market economy.
Why  Be Concerned About Agricultural Structure?
Legislative  and  congressional  support  for  teaching,  research,  and
extension  in  the entire  field  of agriculture  will be  determined in the
future  by  the  votes  of  non-farm  people.  This  does  not  mean  that
farm support is unimportant.
It will be essential to retain the loyalty of the farming community.
I  see  some  evidence  that support  for agricultural research  from  that
source  is  eroding.  But  support  from  the  farming  sector  alone  will
not  be  enough  to  insure  the  flow  of public  funds  for investment
in the agricultural  educational  effort that we believe  is needed.
It  is  in this  context that the  questions  of structure,  organization,
and  control  in  agriculture  acquire  their  critical importance.  Concern
with  the  structure  of  agriculture  is  not  primarily  a  question  of
efficiency  in resource  allocation,  although that is a major considera-
tion.
It is  above  all  a concern  with equity, and increasingly  with equity
as  it  is  perceived  by  the non-farm  population.  It  is primarily  their
money  that  is  being  spent  in  the  agricultural  colleges,  experiment
stations, and extension  services.
In  the  institutional  structure that has  prevailed  in  the past it has
been  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  investment  of  public  funds  in
agricultural  education,  in  all  of its dimensions, has not been creating
a rentier  class.  If opportunities  were created  by this investment, and
particularly  in  research,  for  the  capture  of  economic  rent  it  was
assumed  that  freedom  of  entry,  ease  of access  to  land  and  capital,
and  competitive  markets  would  prevent  the  capture  of  these  rents
by a small group of unintended  beneficiaries.
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evidence  of  the  concentration  of the  economic  rent  generated  by
agricultural  research  in  the hands  of a  steadily declining  number  of
landowners.  This  has  not yet reached  crisis  proportions,  in  a politi-
cal  sense, but it is foolhardy to insist that no crisis is approaching.
This  poses  a greater  long-run  threat to the land-grant  educational
system  than  any  shortages  of resources  or  restrictions  on markets.
We  are  the  custodians  and the  beneficiaries  of  a long  tradition  of
public  trust  and  confidence  in the  dedication  of  agricultural  edu-
cators  to  the  public  good.  If  the  impression  grows that  the invest-
ment  of  public  funds  in  agricultural  education  is  creating  a rentier
class,  it  will  damage  and  ultimately  destroy  the  base  for the  land
grant system.
This  is  the  context  in  which  a concern  for the  structure  of agri-
culture  should  be  interpreted.  We  now  have  a  concentration  of
landholding  in  agriculture  in  the United States that is  as skewed as is
the  landholding  pattern  in  many  countries  now  convulsed  by land
reform  efforts.  We  must  anticipate  a  growing  movement  for land
reform  in  the  United  States,  generated  and  supported  primarily  by
non-farmers.
This  prospect  is quite  different  from  the concern  over concentra-
tion of economic  power  in non-farm  businesses.  The primary reason
for  this  difference  is  the dominant  role played  by land  in the asset
structure  of  agriculture.  Concentration  of  land  ownership  in  the
U.S.  does not imply the same loss of personal freedom that is charac-
teristic  of  an  agrarian  society  in  a  less-developed  country.  But  it
does  violate  some of the most deeply  felt sentiments  of equity  and
fairness,  even  in  an  industrial  culture.  Freedom  of  access  to  food-
producing  land  is  still  one  of  the  most  treasured  freedoms  of the
social order.
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